Ideology, interest groups, and institutional change: The case of the British prohibition of wages in kind

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 175-191

  Tan, Elaine S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953496162     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137405000135     Document Type: Article

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