Valuation and growth rates manipulation

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 87-104

  Gavious, Arieh ^a   Ronen, Joshua ^b   Yaari, Varda ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

growth rates; moral hazard; smoothing; valuation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990369898     PISSN: 16081625     EISSN: 21642257     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2002.10510601     Document Type: Article

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