Reduction of outcome variance: Optimality and incentives

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 309-328

  Meth, Bracha ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038983078     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00502.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Agrawal, A., and G. Mandelker. Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. The Journal of Finance (September 1987), 823-837.
2. Amihud, Y., and B. Lev. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1981), 605-617.
3. Aron, D. Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size and Diversification. Rand Journal of Economics (Spring 1988), 72-87.
4. Baiman, S., and J. Demski. Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems. Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement 1980b), 184-220.
5. Banker, R., and S. Datar. Sensitivity, Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1989), 21-39.
6. Black, F., and M. Scholes. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political Economy (May-June 1973), 637-654.
7. Campbell, T., and W. Kracow. Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (September 1987), 315-328.
8. Christensen, J. Communication in Agencies. Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1981), 661-674.
9. Diamond, D. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic Studies (July 1984), 393-414.
10. Gak, D., and M. Hellwig. Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem. Review of Economic Studies (October 1985), 647-663.
11. Gjesdal, F. Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem. Review of Economic Studies (July 1982), 373-390.
12. Grossman, S., and O. Hart. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica (January 1983), 7-45.
13. Healy, P. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1985), 85-107.
14. Holmstrom, B. Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics (Spring 1979), 74-91.
15. Jewitt, I. Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems. Econometrica (September 1988), 1177-1190.
16. Kim, S.K., and Y.S. Suh. Choice of Accounting Information System and Accounting Income Smoothing. Working Paper. University of California at Los Angeles, 1990.
17. Lambert, R. A. Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard. Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1983), 441-452.
18. Lambert, R.A. Variance Investigation in Agency Settings. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1985), 633-647.
19. Lambert, R. A., and D.F. Larcker. An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts. Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement 1987), 85-129.
20. Milgrom, P. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications. Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1981), 380-391.
21. Mirlees, J.A., and P. Milgrom. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior. Nuffield College, Oxford, 1975.
22. Sarath, B., and R. Verrecchia. Information Quality and Moral Hazard. Working paper. University of Pennsylvania, 1990.
23. Sen, P., and T. Paik. Role of Budget Variance in Controlling Discretionary Expenditures. Working Paper. University of California at Berkeley, 1989.
24. Verrecchia, R. Managerial Discretion in the Choice among Financial Reporting Alternatives. Journal of Accounting and Economics (October 1986), 175-196.