Quantified logic of awareness and impossible possible worlds

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 514-529

  Sillari, Giacomo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84989167997     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020308090072     Document Type: Article

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