Impact of top management power on corporate divestiture

Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 24-30

  Krishnan, Venkat R ^a   Sivakumar, Ranjini ^b  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Divestment; Senior management; United States of America

Indexed keywords

EID: 84986172502     PISSN: 14720701     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/14720700410521934     Document Type: Article

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