Benchmarking government's roles to assure the cooperation in collaborative technology innovation, The case of CDMA technology development

Benchmarking: An International Journal

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 191-213

  Kim, Seoyong ^a  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Innovation; Korea; R D; Technology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84986098726     PISSN: 14635771     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/EUM0000000005623     Document Type: Article

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