R&D Competition in a Mixed Duopoly under Uncertainty and Easy Imitation

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 415-428

  Poyago Theotoky, Joanna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Innovation; Mixed duopoly; R D

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001273989     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jcec.1998.1541     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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