Possible worlds semantics for indicative and counterfactual conditionals?: A formal philosophical inquiry into Chellas-Segerberg semantics

Possible Worlds Semantics for Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals?: A Formal Philosophical Inquiry into Chellas-Segerberg Semantics

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1-348

  Unterhuber, Matthias ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84983294447     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110323665     Document Type: Book

References (174)

1. Adams, E. (1965). The Logic of Conditionals. Inquiry, 8, 166-197.
2. Adams, E. (1966). Probability and the Logic of Conditionals. In J. Hintikka & P. Suppes (Eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic (pp. 265-316). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
3. Adams, E. (1970). Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals. Foundations of Language, 6, 89-94.
4. Adams, E. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
5. Adams, E. (1977). A Note on Comparing Probabilistic and Modal Logics of Conditionals. Theoria, 18, 186-194.
6. Adams, E. (1986). On the Logic of High Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15, 255-279.
7. Adams, E. (1998). A Primer of Probability Logic. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
8. Alchourrôn, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change. Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50, 510-530.
9. Anderson, A. R., Belnap, N., & Dunn, J. M. (1975). Entailment. The Logic of Relevance and Necessity (Vol. 1). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
10. Anderson, A. R., Belnap, N., & Dunn, J. M. (1992). Entailment. The Logic of Relevance and Necessity (Vol. 2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
11. Arlô-Costa, H. (2001). Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals. On the Status of the Export-Import Laws. The Journal of Philosophy, 98, 555-593.
12. Arlô-Costa, H. (2007). The Logic of Conditionals. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-conditionals/.
13. Bacchus, F. (1990). Representing and Reasoning with Probabilistic Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
14. Baltag, A., & Smets, S. (2008). Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision. Synthese, 165, 179-202.
15. Bamber, D. (1994). Probabilistic Entailment of Conditionals by Conditionals. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 24, 1714-1723.
16. Barwise, J., & Cooper, R. (1991). Generalized Quantifiers. Linguistics and Philosophy, 4, 159-219.
17. Beck, S. R., & Guthrie, C. (2011). Almost Thinking Counterfactually. Children’s Understanding of Close Counterfactuals. Child Development, 82, 1189-1198.
18. Beck, S. R., Robinson, E. J., Carroll, D. J., & Apperly, I. A. (2006). Children’s Thinking about Counterfactuals and Future Hypotheticals as Possibilities. Child Development, 77, 413-426.
19. Bennett, J. (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. Biazzo, V., Gilio, A., Lukasiewicz, T., & Sanfilippo, G. (2002). Probabilistic Logic under Coherence, Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic, and Default Reasoning in System P. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 12,189-213.
21. Blackburn, P., de Rijke, M., & Venema, Y. (2001). Modal Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Blau, U. (1978). Die Dreiwertig Logik der Sprache [The Three-Valued Logic of Language]. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
23. Bonati, R. (2005). Nichtmonotone Systeme der deontischen Logik und ihre Bedeutung für die Behandlung bedingter Normen [Non-Monotonic Sys-tems of Deontic Logic and their Meaning for the Treatment of Conditional Norms] (Doctoral dissertation, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria).
24. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Bradley, R. (2000). A Preservaton Condition for Conditionals. Analysis, 60, 219-222.
26. Bremer, M. (2005a). An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
27. Bremer, M. (2005b). Philosophische Semantik [Philosophical Semantics]. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos-Verlag.
28. Brun, G. (2003). Die Richtige Formel. Philosophische Probleme der logischen Formalisierung [The Correct Formula. Philosophical Issues in Logical Formalization]. Frankfurt am Main: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
29. Burgess, J. P. (1981). Quick Completeness Proofs for Some Logics of Conditionals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 22, 76-84.
30. Carnap, R. (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
31. Cartwright, N. (2002). In Favor of Laws that are Not Ceteris Paribus after All. Erkenntnis, 57, 425-439.
32. Chellas, B. F. (1975). Basic Conditional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4, 133-153.
33. Clocksin, W. F., & Mellish, C. S. (2003). Programming in Prolog. Using the ISO Standard (5th ed.). Berlin: Springer.
34. Connolly, A. C., Fodor, J. A., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (2007). Why Stereotypes Don’t even Make Good Defaults. Cognition, 103, 1-22.
35. Davis, W. A. (1979). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. The Philosophical Review, 88, 544-564.
36. Declerck, R., & Reed, S. (2001). Conditionals. A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
37. Delgrande, J. P. (1987). A First-Order Conditional Logic for Prototypical Properties. Artificial Intelligence, 33, 105-130.
38. Delgrande, J. P. (1988). An Approach to Default Reasoning Based on a First-Order Conditional Logic. Revised Report. Artificial Intelligence, 36, 63-90.
39. Delgrande, J. P. (1998). On First-Order Conditional Logics. Artificial Intelligence, 105, 105-137.
40. Douven, I., & Romeijn, J.-W. (2011). A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem. Mind, 120, 637-670.
41. Douven, I., & Verbrugge, S. (2010). The Adams Family. Cognition, 117, 302-318.
42. Dunn, J. M., & Restall, G. (2002). Relevance Logic. In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd ed., Vol. 6, pp. 1-128). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
43. Earman, J., Roberts, J., & Smith, S. (2002). Ceteris Paribus Lost. Erkenntnis, 57, 281-301.
44. Edgington, D. (1995). On Conditionals. Mind, 104, 235-329.
45. Edgington, D. (2007). On Conditionals. In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd ed., Vol. 14, pp. 127-221). Dordrecht: Springer.
46. Enderton, H. B. (2001). A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA: Harcourt/Academic Press.
47. Ereshefsky, M. (2007). Species. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries /species/#SpePlu.
48. Evans, J. S., Handley, S. J., & Over, D. E. (2003). Conditionals and Conditional Probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 321-335.
49. Evans, J. S., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
50. Fagin, R., Halpern, J. Y., Moses, Y., & Vardi, M. Y. (2003). Reasoning about Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
51. Feller, W. (1968). An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications (3rd ed., Vol. 1). New York: Wiley.
52. Fuhrmann, A. (1998). Nonmonotonic logic. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 7, pp. 30-35). London: Routledge.
53. Gabbay, D. M., Kurucz, A., Wolter, F., & Zakharyaschev, M. (2003). ManyDimensional Modal Logics. Theory and Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
54. Gärdenfors, P. (1979). Conditionals and Changes of Belief. Acta Philosoph-ica Fennica, 30, 381-404.
55. Gärdenfors, P. (1986). Belief Revision and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. The Philosophical Review, 95, 81-93.
56. Gärdenfors, P. (1988). Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics ofEpis-temic States. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
57. Geffner, H., & Pearl, J. (1994). A Framework for Reasoning with Defaults. In H. E. Kyburg Jr., R. P. Loui, & G. N. Carlson (Eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning (pp. 69-87). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
58. Gibbard, A. (1980). Two Recent Theories of Conditionals. In W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, & G. Pearce (Eds.), Ifs. Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time (pp. 211-247). Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
59. Gilio, A. (2002). Probabilistic Reasoning under Coherence in System P. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 34, 5-34.
60. Ginsberg, M. L. (1986). Counterfactuals. Artificial Intelligence, 30, 35-79.
61. Giordano, L., Gliozzi, V., & Olivetti, N. (2005). Weak AGM Postulates and Strong Ramsey Test. A Logical Formalization. Artificial Intelligence, 168, 1-37.
62. Goldszmidt, M., & Pearl, J. (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling. Artificial Intelligence, 84, 57-112.
63. Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (4th ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
64. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics (Vol. 3, pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
65. Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press.
66. Grove, A. (1988). Two Modellings for Theory Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17, 157-170.
67. Haegeman, L. (2003). Conditionals Clauses. External and Internal Syntax. Mind & Language, 18, 317-339.
68. Hawthorne, J. (1996). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25,185-218.
69. Hawthorne, J., & Makinson, D. (2007). The Qantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference. Studia Logica, 86, 247-297.
70. Helfman, G. S., Collette, B. B., Facey, D. E., & Bowen, B. W. (2009). The Diversity of Fishes. Biology, Evolution, and Ecology (2nd ed.). Chichester, Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
71. Hendry, H. E., & Pokriefka, M. L. (1985). Carnapian Extensions of S5. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14, 111-128.
72. Horty, J. F. (2001). Nonmonotonic Logic. In L. Goble (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic (pp. 336-361). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
73. Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (1993). Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach (2nd ed.). Chicago: Open Court.
74. Hughes, G. E., & Cresswell, M. J. (1984). A Companion to Modal Logic. London: Methuen.
75. Hughes, G. E., & Cresswell, M. J. (2003). A New Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1996)
76. Hüttemann, A. (1998). Laws and Dispositions. Philosophy of Science, 65, 121-135.
77. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals. A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678.
78. Kleene, S. C. (1952). Introduction to Meta-Mathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
79. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability (N. Morrison, Trans.). New York: Chelsea.
80. Kratzer, A. (1977). What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 337-355.
81. Kratzer, A. (1981). The Notional Category of Modality. In H.-J. Eikmeyer & H. Rieser (Eds.), Words, Worlds, and Contexts (pp. 38-74). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
82. Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cumulative Logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44, 167-207.
83. Lange, M. (1993). Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis, 38, 233-248.
84. Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1992). What Does a Conditional Knowledge Base Entail? Artificial Intelligence, 55, 1-60.
85. Leitgeb, H. (2004). Inference on the Low Level. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
86. Leitgeb, H. (2010). On the Ramsey Test without Triviality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51, 21-54.
87. Leitgeb, H., & Segerberg, K. (2007). Dynamic Doxastic Logic. Why, How, and Where to? Synthese, 155, 167-190.
88. Leslie, S.-J. (2007). Generics and the Structure of the Mind. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 375-403.
89. Levesque, H. J. (1990). All I Know. A Study in Autoepistemic Logic. Artificial Intelligence, 42, 263-309.
90. Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
91. Lewis, C. I. (1912). Implication and the Algebra of Logic. Mind, 21, 522-531.
92. Lewis, C. I., & Langford, C. H. (1932). Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover Publications.
93. Lewis, D. (1970). General Semantics. Synthese, 22, 18-67.
94. Lewis, D. (1971). Completeness and Decidability of Three Logics of Counterfactual Conditionals. Theoria, 37, 74-85.
95. Lewis, D. (1973a). Causation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-567.
96. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
97. Lewis, D. (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. The Philosophical Review, 85, 297-315.
98. Lewis, D. (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow. Nous, 13, 455-476.
99. Lewis, D. (1980). A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance. In R. C. Jeffrey (Ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability (Vol. 2, pp. 263-293). Berkeley: University of California Press.
100. Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish Dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 143-158.
101. Lewis, D. (2000). Causation as Influence. The Journal of Philosophy, 97, 182-197.
102. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1995). The Ramsey Test Revisited. In G. Crocco, L. Farinas del Cerro, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals. From Philosophy to Computer Science (pp. 147-191). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
103. Macdonald, D. W., Seifert, E. R., Balcome, K., Dunbar, R., Bininda-Emonds, O., Best, R., et al. (2007). What is a Mammal? In D. W. Macdonald (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Mammals. Oxford University Press. Oxford Reference Online. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t227.e156viaUniv-undLandesbibliothekDüsseldorf.
104. Makinson, D. (1993). Five Faces of Minimality. Studia Logica, 52, 339-379.
105. Makinson, D. (1994). General Patterns in Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, & J. A. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming (Vol. 3, pp. 35110). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
106. McCall, S. (1966). Connexive Implication. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 31,415-433.
107. McCarthy, J. (1980). Circumscription - A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13, 27-39.
108. McCarthy, J. (1989). Artificial Intelligence, Logic and Formalizing Common Sense. In R. H. Thomason (Ed.), Philosophical Logic and Artificial Intelligence (pp. 161-190). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
109. McCarthy, J., & Hayes, P. J. (1969). Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 4 (pp. 463-502). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
110. McGee, V. (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 462-471.
111. McGee, V. (1989). Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals. The Philosophical Review, 98, 485-541.
112. McKenna, M. C., & Bell, S. K. (1997). Classification of Mammals above the Species Level. New York: Columbia University Press.
113. Meyer, J.-J. C., & van der Hoek, W. (1995). Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
114. Nejdl, W. (1992). The P-Systems. A Systematic Classification of Logics of Nonmonotonicity. Extended Report (Tech. Rep.). Vienna, Austria: Technical University of Vienna.
115. Nickel, B. (2009). Generics and the Ways of Normality. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, 629-648.
116. Nickel, B. (2010). Ceteris Paribus Laws. Generics & Natural Kinds. Philo-sphers’ Imprint, 10, 1-25.
117. Nute, D. (1980). Topics in Conditional Logic. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
118. Nute, D. (1992). Basic Defeasible Logic. In L. Farinas del Cerro & M. Pent-tonnen (Eds.), Intentional Logics for Programming (pp. 125-154). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
119. Nute, D., & Cross, C. B. (2001). Conditional Logic. In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd ed., Vol. 4, pp. 1-98). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
120. Oberauer, K., & Wilhelm, O. (2003). The Meaning(s) of Conditionals. Conditional Probabilities, Mental Models, and Personal Utilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 680-693.
121. Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann. (Revised Second Printing)
122. Pearl, J. (1990). System Z. A Natural Ordering of Defaults with Tractable Applications to Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In R. Parikh (Ed.), Proceedings of the Third Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (pp. 121-135). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann.
123. Pelletier, F. J. (1997). Generics and Defaults. In J. van Benthem & A. ter Meulen (Eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language (pp. 1125-1177). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
124. Pelletier, F. J., Elio, R., & Hanson, P. (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica, 88, 3-66.
125. Peters, S., & Westerstähl, D. (2008). Quantifiers in Language and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
126. Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2010). The Conditional in Mental Probability Logic. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds.), Cognition and Conditionals. Probability and Logic in Human Thinking (pp. 153-173). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
127. Poole, D. (1988). A Logical Framework for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 36, 27-47.
128. Portner, P. (2009). Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
129. Priest, G. (2008). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
130. Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word & Oject. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
131. Rafetseder, E., Cristi-Vargas, R., & Perner, J. (2010). Counterfactual Reasoning. Developing a Sense of “Nearest Possible World”. Child Development, 81, 376-389.
132. Rafetseder, E., & Perner, J. (2010). Is Reasoning from Counterfactual Antecedents Evidence for Counterfactual Reasoning? Thinking & Reasoning, 16, 131-155.
133. Ramsey, F. P. (1965). The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (R. B. Braithwaite, Ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD.
134. Âqvist, L. (2002). Deontic Logic. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenther (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd ed., Vol. 8, pp. 147-264). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.
135. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press.
136. Reiter, R. (1980). A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13,81-132.
137. Reutlinger, A., Schurz, G., & Hüttemann, A. (2011). Ceteris Paribus Laws. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ceteris-paribus/.
138. Rott, H. (2001). Chance, Choice and Inference. A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
139. Routley, R., & Montgomery, H. (1968). On Systems Containing Aristotle’s Thesis. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 33, 82-96.
140. Schrenk, M. (2008). A Lewisian Theory for Special Science Laws. In D. Bohse, K. Dreimann, & S. Walter (Eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, 6th International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy. Paderborn: Mentis.
141. Schurz, G. (1991). Relevant Deduction. From Solving Paradoxes towards a General Theory. Erkenntnis, 35, 391-437.
142. Schurz, G. (1994). Probabilistic Justification of Default Reasoning. In B. Nebel & L. Dreschler-Fischer (Eds.), KI-94. Advances in Artificial Intelligence (pp. 248-259). Berlin: Springer.
143. Schurz, G. (1996). The Role of Negation in Nonmonotonic Logic and Defeasible Reasoning. In H. Wansing (Ed.), Negation. A Notion in Focus (pp. 197-231). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
144. Schurz, G. (1997a). TheIs-OughtProblem. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
145. Schurz, G. (1997b). Probabilistic Default Logic Based on Irrelevance and Relevance Assumptions. In D. M. Gabbay, R. Kruse, A. Nonnengart, & H. J. Ohlbach (Eds.), Qualitative and Quantitative Practical Reasoning(pp. 536-553). Berlin: Springer.
146. Schurz, G. (1998). Probabilistic Semantics for Delgrande’s Conditional Logic and a Counterexample to His Default Logic. Artificial Intelligence, 102, 81-95.
147. Schurz, G. (2001a). Rudolf Carnap’s Modal Logic. In W. Stelzner & M. Stöckler (Eds.), Zwischen traditioneller und moderner Logik. Nichtklassische Ansätze (pp. 365-380). Paderborn: Mentis.
148. Schurz, G. (2001b). What is ‘Normal’? An Evolution-Theoretic Foundation for Normic Laws and Their Relation to Statistical Normality. Philosophy of Science, 68, 476-497.
149. Schurz, G. (2002). Ceteris Paribus Laws. Classification and Deconstruction. Erkenntnis, 57, 351-372.
150. Schurz, G. (2004). Logic, Matter of Form, and Closure under Substitution. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (Eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004 (pp. 33-46). Prague: Filosofia.
151. Schurz, G. (2005a). Alethic Modal Logics and Semantics. In D. Jacquette (Ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic (pp. 442-477). Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Original work published 2002)
152. Schurz, G. (2005b). Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective. Ontic, Logical and Cognitive Foundations. Synthese, 146, 37-51.
153. Schurz, G. (2007). Human Conditional Reasoning Explained by NonMonotonicity and Probability. An Evolutionary Account. In S. Vos-niadou, D. Kayser, & A. Protopapas (Eds.), Procceedings of the Eu-roCogSci 2007 (pp. 628-633). Hove, East Sussex, U.K.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
154. Schurz, G. (2008). Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie [Introduction to Philosophy of Science] (2nd ed.). Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
155. Schurz, G. (2011). Tweety, or Why Probabilism and even Bayesianism Need Objective and Evidential Probabilities. In D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzales, S. Hartmann, M. Stöltzner, & M. Weber (Eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures (pp. 57-74). New York: Springer.
156. Schurz, G. (2012). Prototypes and their Composition from an Evolutionary Point of View. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (pp. 530-553). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
157. Schurz, G., & Thorn, P. D. (2012). Reward versus Risk in Uncertain Inference. Theorems and Simulations. Review of Symbolic Logic, 5, 574-612.
158. Segerberg, K. (1989). Notes on Conditional Logic. Studia Logica, 48, 157-168.
159. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance. Communication and Cognition (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
160. Spohn, W. (1975). An Analysis of Hansson’s Dyadic Deontic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4, 237-252.
161. Spohn, W. (2012). The Laws of Belief. Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
162. Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (pp. 98-112). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
163. Stalnaker, R. C. (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science, 37, 64-80.
164. Stalnaker, R. C. (1975). Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia, 5, 269-286.
165. Stalnaker, R. C., & Thomason, R. H. (1970). A Semantical Analysis of Conditional Logic. In S. Körner (Ed.), Practical Reason (pp. 23-42). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
166. Stein, E. (1996). Without Good Reason. The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
167. Strevens, M. (in press). Ceteris Paribus Hedges. Causal Voodoo that Works. Journal of Philosophy.
168. Talbott, W. (2008). Bayesian Epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/.
169. Thorn, P. D. (in press). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic.
170. Unterhuber, M., & Schurz, G. (in press). The New Tweety Puzzle. Arguments against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science. Synthese.
171. van Benthem, J. (2001). Correspondence Theory. In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 325-408). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
172. Wansing, H. (2010). Connexive Logic. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-connexive/.
173. Weingartner, P., & Schurz, G. (1986). Paradoxes Solved by Simple Relevance Criteria. Logique et Analyse, 113, 3-40.
174. Werning, M. (2012). Non-Symbolic Compositional Representation and Its Neuronal Foundation. Towards an Emulative Semantics. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Composi-tionality (pp. 633-654). Oxford: Oxford University Press.