Posted pricing for robust crowdsensing

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)

Volumn 05-08-July-2016, Issue , 2016, Pages 261-270

  Han, Kai ^a   Huang, He ^b   Luo, Jun ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^b SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY   (China)

^c NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Crowdsensing; Poisson binomial distribution; Pricing; Sub modular optimization

Indexed keywords

BINS; BUDGET CONTROL; COSTS; MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS; NUMERICAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; POISSON DISTRIBUTION; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

APPROXIMATE ALGORITHMS; COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS; CROWDSENSING; HISTORICAL INFORMATION; MODULAR OPTIMIZATIONS; POISSON BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTIONS; SENSING QUALITIES; SUBMODULAR OPTIMIZATIONS;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 84979200790     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2942358.2942385     Document Type: Conference Paper

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