The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 429-451

  Yataganas, Xenophon ^a   Tsebelis, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitution for Europe; Core; Decision Making; European Convention Draft; Legislative Procedures; Qualified Majority; Status Quo; Treaty of Nice; Veto Players Analysis; Winset

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961832902     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019605004293     Document Type: Article

References (69)

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6. There is a debate between constitutional law specialists about the appropriate term. Apparently, the final text is a Constitutional treaty rather than a real Constitution, because it is submitted to ratification by all member states. Cf. J. Cl. Piris, ‘Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/2000,
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28. Such a core does not always exist. Joseph Greenberg has shown that such a core always exists if q>n/(n+1) where q is the required majority and n is the dimensionality of the policy space, see, J. Greenberg, ‘Consistent Majority Rule over Compact Sets of Alternatives’, 47 Econometrica (1979) p. 627.
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69. There are essentially the external affairs and common security policy, the matters considered of quasi-constitutional nature, like the composition of the European Parliament, the fiscal status of his members, and the uniform electoral system, the linguistic regime of the EU, the treatment of the eventual heavy violations of the Constitution by the member states, the budgetary and financial decisions, the matters related to the non-discrimination and the citizenship of the Union, the fiscal questions, the social security and labor policy, the external status of the Euro. For a complete list, see J.P. Jacqué, ‘Le Conseil des Ministres, La conclusion d'une réforme déjà entreprise’, in Dony & Bribosia Jean Monnet Working Paper n. 3, at p. 158.