Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?

Public Choice

Volumn 166, Issue 1-2, 2016, Pages 69-86

  Hong, Sounman ^a   Lim, Jeehun ^a  

^a Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Allocative efficiency; Bureaucratic integrity; Capture; Corruption; Lobbying; Political connections; Revolving door

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961136235     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: 15737101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0315-x     Document Type: Article

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