Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 813-847

  Mizoguchi, Tetsuro ^a   Van Quyen, Nguyen ^b  

^a REITAKU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865755059     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01563.x     Document Type: Article

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