Embodied simulation as second-person perspective on intersubjectivity

Neuroscience and Critique: Exploring the Limits of the Neurological Turn

Volumn , Issue , 2016, Pages 188-202

  Gallese, Vittorio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PARMA   (Italy)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84960477705     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315714189     Document Type: Chapter

References (86)

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