Groundwater management at varamin plain: The consideration of stochastic and environmental effects

International Journal of Environmental Research

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 21-30

  Najafi Alamdarlo, H ^a   Ahmadian, M ^b   Khalilian, S ^a  

^a TARBIAT MODARES UNIVERSITY   (Iran)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN   (Iran)

Author keywords

Cooperative and non cooperative game; Groundwater; Stochastic and environmental effects; Varamin plain

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT; GROUNDWATER RESOURCE; IRRIGATION SYSTEM; STOCHASTICITY; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER SUPPLY; WATER USE;

IRAN; TEHRAN [IRAN]; VARAMIN;

EID: 84960355503     PISSN: 17356865     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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