Application of game theory for a groundwater conflict in Mexico

Journal of Environmental Management

Volumn 84, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 560-571

  Raquel, Salazar ^a   Ferenc, Szidarovszky ^b   Emery, Coppola ^c   Abraham, Rojano ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA CHAPINGO   (Mexico)

^b University of Arizona   (United States)

^c NOAH LLC   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict resolution; Game theory; Optimization techniques; Systems modeling; Water management.

Indexed keywords

AQUIFERS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY; GROUNDWATER RESOURCES; IRRIGATION; LOSSES; SURFACE WATERS; WATER CONSERVATION; WATER QUALITY;

CONFLICT RESOLUTION; CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES; ECONOMIC BENEFITS; IRRIGATION DISTRICTS; ME-XICO; OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES; SYSTEM MODELS; WATER MANAGEMENT.; WATERS MANAGEMENTS; WATERS RESOURCES;

WATER MANAGEMENT;

FERTILIZER; GROUND WATER; PESTICIDE; RAIN;

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION; AQUIFER; CROP YIELD; GAME THEORY; GROUNDWATER RESOURCE; IRRIGATION; OPTIMIZATION; WATER MANAGEMENT;

AQUIFER; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; CROP PRODUCTION; ECONOMIC ASPECT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; GAME; HARVEST; IRRIGATION (AGRICULTURE); MEXICO; QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS; THEORETICAL STUDY; WATER CONTAMINATION; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER QUALITY;

GUANAJUATO; MEXICO [NORTH AMERICA]; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 34447300740     PISSN: 03014797     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.07.011     Document Type: Article

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