Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness

Nature

Volumn 530, Issue 7591, 2016, Pages 473-476

  Jordan, Jillian J ^a   Hoffman, Moshe ^b   Bloom, Paul ^a   Rand, David G ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL METHOD; NUMERICAL MODEL; SIGNALING;

COOPERATION; GAME; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; PSYCHOLOGY; PUNISHMENT; TRUST;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; TRUST;

EID: 84959386877     PISSN: 00280836     EISSN: 14764687     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nature16981     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. Third-party punishment and social norms. Evol. Hum. Behav. 25, 63-87 (2004).
2. Goette, L., Huffman, D., & Meier, S. The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment to real social groups. Am. Econ. Rev. 96, 212-216 (2006).
3. Jordan, J. J., McAuliffe, K., & Rand, D. G. The effects of endowment size and strategy method on third party punishment. Exp. Econ. http://dx.doi. org/10.1007/s10683-015-9466-8 (2015).
4. Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & Obrien, E. Audience effects on moralistic punishment. Evol. Hum. Behav. 28, 75-84 (2007).
5. Balafoutas, L., & Nikiforakis, N. Norm enforcement in the city: a natural field experiment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 56, 1773-1785 (2012).
6. Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 108, 11375-11380 (2011).
7. FeldmanHall, O., Sokol-Hessner, P., Van Bavel, J. J., & Phelps, E. A. Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself. Nature Commun. 5, 5306 (2014).
8. Zahavi, A. Mate selection-A selection for a handicap. J. Theor. Biol. 53, 205-214 (1975).
9. Gintis, H., Smith, E. A., & Bowles, S. Costly signaling and cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 213, 103-119 (2001).
10. Roberts, G. Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle. Proc. Biol. Sci. 265, 427-431 (1998).
11. Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. Human cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 413-425 (2013).
12. Guala, F. Reciprocity: weak or strong?. What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 1-15 (2012).
13. Henrich, J., et al. Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767-1770 (2006).
14. Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437, 1291-1298 (2005).
15. Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. The reputation of punishers. Trends Ecol. Evol. 30, 98-103 (2015).
16. Barclay, P. Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment. Evol. Hum. Behav. 27, 325-344 (2006).
17. Fessler, D. M., & Haley, K. J. in The Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (ed. Hammerstein, P.) (MIT Press, 2003).
18. Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 108, 432-502 (2014).
19. Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. A mutualistic approach to morality: the evolution of fairness by partner choice. Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 59-78 (2013).
20. Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science 328, 617-620 (2010).
21. van Veelen, M. Robustness against indirect invasions. Games Econ. Behav. 74, 382-393 (2012).
22. Nelissen, R. M. A. The price you pay: cost-Dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment. Evol. Hum. Behav. 29, 242-248 (2008).
23. Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. Humans display a ?cooperative phenotype? that is domain general and temporally stable. Nature Commun. 5, 4939 (2014).
24. Horita, Y. Punishers may be chosen as providers but not as recipients. Lett. Evol. Behav. Sci. 1, 6-9 (2010).
25. Bear, A., & Rand, D. G. Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 113, 936-941 (2016).
26. Peysakhovich, P., & Rand, D. G. Habits of virtue: creating norms of cooperation and defection in the laboratory. Management Science http://dx.doi. org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168 (2015).
27. Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so. Evolution 69, 993-1003 (2015).