Directed search in the housing market

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 19, Issue , 2016, Pages 218-231

  Albrecht, James ^a   Gautier, Pieter A ^b   Vroman, Susan ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Directed search; Housing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84958121600     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2015.05.002     Document Type: Article

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