Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 531-545

  Jenkin, Zoe ^a   Siegel, Susanna ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84948151078     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0252-5     Document Type: Editorial

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