From interventions to mechanistic explanations

Synthese

Volumn 193, Issue 10, 2016, Pages 3311-3327

  Baetu, Tudor M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Causation; Mechanism; Modulairty; Philosophy of biology; Scientific explanation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84944691476     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0930-y     Document Type: Article

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