What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 119-135

  Illari, Phyllis McKay ^a   Williamson, Jon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Astrophysical mechanism; Bechtel; Explanation; Glennan; MDC; Mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863512209     PISSN: 18794912     EISSN: 18794920     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-011-0038-2     Document Type: Article

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