Buffering and enabling: The impact of interlocking political ties on firm survival and sales growth

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 36, Issue 11, 2015, Pages 1615-1636

  Zheng, Weiting ^a   Singh, Kulwant ^b   Mitchell, Will ^c,d  

^a HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^d DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

China; dissolution; growth; interlocking political ties; performance

Indexed keywords

DISSOLUTION; GROWTH (MATERIALS); MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

CHINA; FIRM SURVIVAL; INTERLOCKING POLITICAL TIES; MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES; PERFORMANCE; RELATIVE IMPACT; RESOURCE DEPENDENCES; RESOURCE-BASED THEORY;

SALES;

EID: 84942985786     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2301     Document Type: Article

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