Deconstructing the mythology of shareholder value: A comment on Lynn Stout's ⇜the shareholder value myth”

Accounting, Economics and Law

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 15-42

  Clarke, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Financialization; Mythology; Shareholder value

Indexed keywords

EID: 84941131970     PISSN: None     EISSN: 21522820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/ael-2013-0006     Document Type: Article

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