Firm, property and governance: From Berle and means to the agency theory, and beyond

Accounting, Economics and Law

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2012, Pages

  Weinstein, Olivier ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 13   (France)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Berle; Contractual theories; Corporate governance; Corporate social responsibility; Corporation; Institutional economics; Law and economics; Ownership and control; Power; Property rights; Real entity; Shareholder primacy; Theory of the firm

Indexed keywords

EID: 85046790319     PISSN: None     EISSN: 21522820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/2152-2820.1061     Document Type: Article

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