Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation

Interest Groups and Advocacy

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 4-29

  LaPira, Timothy M ^a   Thomas, Herschel F ^b  

^a JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress; Congressional staff; Interest groups; Lobbying; Lobbying Disclosure Act; Revolving door

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939196880     PISSN: 20477414     EISSN: 20477422     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/iga.2013.16     Document Type: Article

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