Interest group influence on rule making

Administration and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 325-347

  Furlong, Scott R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031499031     PISSN: 00953997     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/009539979702900304     Document Type: Article

References (46)

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