The theory of risk classification

Handbook of Insurance: Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 281-313

  Crocker, Keith J ^a   Snow, Arthur ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Classification; Information; Informational asymmetry; Insurance; Risk categorization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939171158     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_11     Document Type: Chapter

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