Advantageous effects of regulatory adverse selection in the life insurance market

Economic Journal

Volumn 116, Issue 508, 2006, Pages 327-354

  Polborn, Mattias K ^a   Hoy, Michael ^b   Sadanand, Asha ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MODEL; MORTALITY RISK; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 33645949086     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01059.x     Document Type: Article

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