The Problematic Welfare Standards of Behavioral Paternalism

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 409-425

  Whitman, Douglas Glen ^a   Rizzo, Mario J ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938852673     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0244-5     Document Type: Article

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