Drift into failure: From hunting broken components to understanding complex systems

Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex Systems

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-220

  Dekker, Sidney ^a  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISASTERS; MARINE POLLUTION; OIL SPILLS; SPACE SHUTTLES;

COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS; COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS; COMPLEXITY THEORY; DRIFT INTO FAILURES; INITIAL CONDITIONS; SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA; SYSTEM BREAKDOWN; SYSTEMS THINKING;

LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS;

EID: 84938566630     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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