The ethnic security dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 261-278

  Collins, Alan ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937178655     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS20-3C     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. * The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments made on an earlier draft of this article. I am indebted to the British Academy for the financial support which made this research possible and the assistance provided by members of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies while I was a visiting fellow in April 1998.
2. Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World”, in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, edited by Brian L. Job (Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 11–35.
3. Renée de Nevers, “Democratization and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival 35, no. 2 (Sum-mer 1993), pp. 31–48.
4. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993),
5. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27–47.
6. See “Ethnic Nationalism, Conflict, and War”, International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996).
7. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufman write, “Offence-defence theory (or security dilemma theory) is…” and thus explicitly make the debates about offence-defence synonymous with the security dilemma. See Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufman, “What is the Offence-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?”, International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 44.
8. John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A study in theories and realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), p. 3.
9. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), p. 21.
10. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19–20.
11. John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 241.
12. Posen, op. cit., p. 27. Stuart J. Kaufman, “An ‘international’ theory of inter-ethnic war”, Review of International Studies 22, no. 2 (April 1996): 151.
13. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 96–107.
14. William Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy”, in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.74.
15. See Syed Azhar and Roslina Mohammed, “Security and stability vital”, Malaysian Star, 27 July 1997.
16. For more details on identity and threats to it, see Barry Buzan, “Societal security, state security and internationalisation”, in Waever et al., op. cit., pp. 41–58.
17. Bumiputeras refers to Malays and other indigenous groups in Malaysia, and is a derivative of bumiputra, which means sons of the soil. These terms are used to distinguish between the Malays and non-Malays.
18. Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 65.
19. William Case, “Comparative Malaysian Leadership: Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mahathir Mohamad”, Asian Survey 31, no. 5 (May 1991): 467.
20. Amnesty International concluded that Mahathir’s use of the ISA (Internal Security Act) was unjustified since the people arrested “did not in any way use or advocate the use of violence”. The fact that the arrested individuals included Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), and other individuals critical of the Mahathir reign adds weight to the belief that the Malaysian Prime Minister used the events of 1987 to further his own consolidation of power. Jean DeBernardi and Christopher Taronwski, “Managing Multicultural Societies: The Status of Minority Groups in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand”, in New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues, edited by Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), p. 86. See also Suhaini Aznam, “Mahathir cracks down”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1987, p. 14.
21. The low percentage of Malays in the 1931 census can partly be explained by the inclusion of the Chinese living in Singapore.
22. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), pp. 121–25.
23. During the 1960s the UMNO leadership started a number of economic institutions, such as the MARA (Council of Trust for the Indigenous), Bank Bumiputra (Indig-enous Bank), and Bank Pertanian (Agricultural Bank) all designed to help Malays venture into economic activities. They tried to change the way Malays thought about their “way of life” so that they could take advantage of the opportunities being created for them. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, even called upon Malays to take up the challenge of modernity. For details, see Hussin Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 48. The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced after the 1969 race riots involved even greater state intervention in the economy as it redistributed corpo-rate assets in favour of Malays. Such interventions included making shares avail-able to Malays at preferential rates and obliging companies to train Malays for managerial positions.
24. For details on Chinese resentment towards the education policy, see Esman, op. cit., pp. 69–70.
25. See Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 60–61.
26. For details of the riots and fears of both communities, see Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 308–38.
27. Case, “Comparative Malaysian Leadership”, p. 460.
28. James Jesudason, Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 52.
29. Quoted in N.J.Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organisation and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heineman, 1980), p. 208.
30. John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murray, 1969), p. 18.
31. John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murray, 1969), p. 26.
32. Funston, op. cit., p. 211.
33. Suhaini Aznam, “The language of politics”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 October 1987, p. 21.
34. Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Do elections make a difference?” in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, edited by R.H.Taylor (New York: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1996), p. 132.
35. Laurence K.L. Siaw, “Malaysia in 1979: Restructuring the Economy, Realigning Political Forces”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980), p. 218.
36. See Ho Wah Foon, “Non-Muslims upset over compulsory Islamic studies”, Straits Times, 28 June 1997. It should be noted that it was “Islamic studies and Asian civilisations” that was to be a compulsory subject, and the initial furore occurred because when it was announced, the Asian civilization component was not in-cluded.
37. They prefer to regard the security dilemma as referring to situations where actors have incentives to resort to the use of pre-emptive force. This narrow definition of the security dilemma, which rests entirely on the offensive/defensive weapon characteristic, is highly contentious and they acknowledge “some readers may prefer the broader use of the term security dilemma”, which “rests on information failures and problems of credible commitments”. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 52n, 26, 52.
38. They prefer to regard the security dilemma as referring to situations where actors have incentives to resort to the use of pre-emptive force. This narrow definition of the security dilemma, which rests entirely on the offensive/defensive weapon characteristic, is highly contentious and they acknowledge “some readers may prefer the broader use of the term security dilemma”, which “rests on information failures and problems of credible commitments”. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 52n, pp. 51–52.
39. They prefer to regard the security dilemma as referring to situations where actors have incentives to resort to the use of pre-emptive force. This narrow definition of the security dilemma, which rests entirely on the offensive/defensive weapon characteristic, is highly contentious and they acknowledge “some readers may prefer the broader use of the term security dilemma”, which “rests on information failures and problems of credible commitments”. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 52n, p. 57.
40. The MCA claims to have been instrumental in the setting up of the Mandarin language Chinese college, known as the New Era College. See “MCA to help raise funds for new Chinese college”, Straits Times, 7 July 1997.
41. Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic”, in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, edited by Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 152.
42. See Crouch, “Malaysia: Do elections make a difference?”, p.128.
43. Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic”, p. 153.
44. Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic”, p. 147.
45. Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy”, p. 87.
46. William Case has written of the ethnic bargain as the division between the Malay and Chinese of political and economic responsibilities. This bargain, he asserts, was manifest in the Alliance, with Malays holding the dominant political posts while the financial and trade ministries were reserved for officials from the MCA. See Case, “Comparative Malaysian Leadership”, p. 459, and ibid., p. 79.
47. See the exchange between Gerald Segal and Charles Hampden-Turner in “Asia’s Infinite Game”, Prospect, March 1997. See also Alan Dupont, “Is There An Asian Way?” Survival 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 13–33.
48. Donald G. McCloud, Southeast Asia: Tradition and Modernity in the Contemporary World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 270–71.
49. Quoted from Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy”, pp. 82–83.
50. Quoted from Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy”, p. 104.
51. Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, contends that Malaysia “cannot go into the 21st Century with people living a separate identity except that they hold the same passport, hold the same identity card”. For Badawi, the creation of a Malaysian identity is a clear objective. See Frank Ching, “Forging Malaysia’s Identity”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August 1996, p. 36.
52. T.N. Harper, “New Malays, New Malaysians: Nationalism, Society and History”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 242
53. James V. Jesudason, “Chinese Business and Ethnic Equilibrium in Malaysia”, Development and Change 28, no. 1 (1997): 131.
54. James V. Jesudason, “Chinese Business and Ethnic Equilibrium in Malaysia”, Development and Change 28, no. 1 (1997): p. 139.
55. See Donald L. Horowitz, “Cause and consequence in public theory: Ethnic policy and system transformation in Malaysia”, Policy Sciences 22, no. 3-4 (November 1989): 261.
56. “Bumi policy not being dumped”, Straits Times, 30 March 1998.