How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2016, Pages 437-449

  Suter, Renata S ^a   Pachur, Thorsten ^a   Hertwig, Ralph ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

affect; minimax rule; probability weighting; prospect theory; risky choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 84934324454     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1888     Document Type: Article

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