Models of network formation in cooperative games

Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 58-88

  van den Nouweland, Anne ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929728761     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.003     Document Type: Chapter

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