Values of games with probabilistic graphs

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 79-95

  Calvo, Emilio ^a   Lasaga, Javier ^b   Van Den Nouweland, Anne ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

^b Avda Lehendakari Agirre 83   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication restrictions; Direct communication; Myerson value; Probabilistic graphs; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042044310     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00013-4     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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