An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 24, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 2-9

  Feinberg, Yossi ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040005717     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0614     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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2. Bloch, F. (1996). "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games Econom. Behav. 14, 90-123.
3. Borm, P., van den Nouweland, A., and Tijs, S. (1994). "Cooperation and Communication Restrictions: a Survey," in Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations (Robert P. Gilles and Pieter H. M. Ruys, Eds.), Chap. 9. Boston MA: Kluwer Academic.
4. Hart, S., and Kurz, M. (1983). "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica 51(4), 1047-1064.
5. Kirman, A., Oddou, C., and Weber, S. (1986). "Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation," Econometrica 54(1), 129-138.
6. Myerson, R. B. (1977). "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225-229.
7. Rosenthal, E. C. (1992). "Coalition Formation under Limited Communication," Games Econom. Behav. 4, 402-421.
8. van den Nouweland, A. (1995). "Games and Graphs in Economic Situations," Ph.D. dissertation, Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University.