Mathematics, models, and modality: Selected philosophical essays

Mathematics, Models, and Modality: Selected Philosophical Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-301

  Burgess, John P ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84928289402     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511487347     Document Type: Book

References (305)

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