Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 947-957

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a,b   Gale, Ian ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

^c GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Liquidity constraint; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

PRICE DYNAMICS;

EID: 0032804001     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00107-X     Document Type: Article

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