Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the human rights act 1998: Judicial reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza

Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 114-142

  Kavanagh, Aileen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84927041907     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511493775.008     Document Type: Chapter

References (66)

1. Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘The Rocks or the Open Sea: Where Is the Human Rights Act Heading?’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 3, 9.
2. J. Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 246.
3. J. Bell and G. Engles, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths, 1995).
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5. A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd edn, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005)
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8. ‘Proportionality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Influence of European Legal Concepts on UK Law’ (1997) 3 EPL 561, 562.
9. ‘Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law’ [2001] PL 684, 691.
10. F. Schauer, ‘Ashwander Revisited’ [1995] Supreme Court Review 71, 91.
11. A. Ashworth, ‘Interpreting Criminal Statutes: A Crisis of Legality’ (1991) 107 LQR 419, 422-3.
12. Bell and Engles, Cross on Statutory Interpretation, above n. 3, p. 166.
13. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparteSimms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131.
14. Lord Hoffmann, Matadeen v. Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, 110.
15. Ashworth, ‘Interpreting Criminal Statutes’, above n. 7, p. 445.
16. Stanley Burnton J; International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 344, per Jonathan Parker LJ.
17. A. Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259, 274ff.
18. C. Gearty, ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 LQR 248, 252.
19. A. Kavanagh, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2006) 26 OJLS 179.
20. R. (Anderson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 1800.
21. Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] 2 WLR 1174.
22. Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation’, above n. 13, pp. 270-4 and 279-82, n. 11, para. 33.
23. Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation under the HRA’, n. 13, pp. 266-7.
24. A. Young, ‘Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza: Avoiding the Deference Trap’ [2005] PL 23, 26.
25. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1998] 2 WLR225, per Ward LJ (CA), p. 338.
26. Robert Wintemute, ‘Same-Sex Partners, Living as Husband and Wife, and Section Three of the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] PL 621, 627.
27. D. Feldman, ‘Remedies for Violations of Convention Rights under the Human Rights Act’ [1998] EHRLR 691-711.
28. I. Leigh and L. Lustgarten, ‘Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies and the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 58 CLJ 509, 536.
29. Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation under the HRA’, above n. 13, p. 262.
30. Wintemute, ‘Same-Sex Partners’, above n. 64, p. 627.
31. Kavanagh, ‘Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The ‘Radical’ Approach to Section 3(1) Revisited’, above n. 57, p. 273.
32. A. Henderson, ‘Readings and Remedies: Section 3(1) of the HRA and Rectifying Constructions’ [2000] Judicial Review 258ff.
33. Wintemute, ‘Same-Sex Partners’, above n. 64, p. 627.
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35. Lord Steyn, ‘Pepper v. Hart: A Re-examination’ (2001) 21 OJLS 59-72.
36. Lord Phillips, ‘The Interpretation of Contracts and Statutes’, Lecture, 10 October 2001, www.keatingchambers.com/KEATING_LECTURE_Oct2001.doc.
37. A. Kavanagh, ‘Pepper v. Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle’ (2005) 121 LQR 98, 112-21.
38. Kavanagh, ‘Pepper v. Hart’, above n. 84, pp. 105-7.
39. Leigh and Lustgarten, ‘Making Right Real’, above n. 71, p. 536.
40. Marshall, ‘The Lynchpin of Parliamentary Intention: Lost, Stolen or Strained?’ [2003] PL 236, 238-9.
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42. S. Vogenauer, ‘A Retreat from Pepper v. Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn’ (2005) 25 OJLS 629, 661.
43. G. Phillipson, ‘(Mis-)reading Section Three of the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 119 LQR 183ff.
44. T. Campbell, ‘Incorporation through Interpretation’, in T. Campbell, K. D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 99-100.
45. Gearty, ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’, above n. 13, p. 250.
46. Phillipson, ‘(Mis-)reading Section Three’, above n. 99, pp. 183ff.
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48. F. Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] EHRLR 125, 130ff.
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51. D. Nicol, ‘Gender Reassignment and the Transformation of the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 120 LQR 195, 197.
52. D. Nicol, ‘Are Convention Rights a No-Go Zone for Parliament?’ [2002] PL 438, 441.
53. Marshall, ‘The Lynchpin of Parliamentary Intention’, above n. 89, pp. 243-4.
54. Nicol, ‘Are Convention Rights a No-Go Zone for Parliament?’, above n. 103, p. 442.
55. Klug, ‘Judicial Deference’, above n. 103, p. 131 (emphasis added).
56. Lord Lester, ‘Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law’, above n. 6, p. 691.
57. Henderson, ‘Readings and Remedies: Section 3(1) of the HRA and Rectifying Constructions’, above n. 75, p. 261.
58. Kavanagh, ‘Unlocking the Human Rights Act’, above n. 57, p. 273.
59. Lord Nicholls stated: ‘A husband is a man and a wife is a woman’, p. 43.
60. Wintemute, ‘Same-Sex Partners’, above n. 64, p. 621.
61. N. Bamforth, ‘A Constitutional Basis for Antidiscrimination Protection?’ (2003) 119 LQR 215, 217.
62. M. Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs a Concept of Due Deference’, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2003), p. 351.
63. Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation’, above n. 2, p. 254.
64. Wintemute, ‘Same-Sex Partners’, above n. 64, p. 627.
65. Laws LJ, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the Interpretation of Enactments in the UK’, in R. Bigwood (ed.), The Statute: Making and Meaning (Wellington: Lexis-Nexis, 2004), p. 245.
66. Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal in Fitzpatrick [1998] Ch 304, 324ff.