Marriage and the economy

Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-34

  Grossbard Shechtman, Shoshana ^a  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926990494     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511615863.003     Document Type: Chapter

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