Chapter 3 The formation and dissolution of families: Why marry? Who marries whom? And what happens upon divorce

Handbook of Population and Family Economics

Volumn 1, Issue PART A, 1997, Pages 81-123

  Weiss, Yoram ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956742053     PISSN: 1574003X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-003X(97)80020-7     Document Type: Review

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