Marriage contracts and the law-and-economics of marriage: An Austrian perspective

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 665-690

  Grossbard Shechtman, Shoshana ^a   Lemennicier, Bertrand ^b  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b University of Paris Pantheon Assas   (France)

Author keywords

Austrian economics; Contracts; Law and economics; Marriage

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033473025     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(99)00059-1     Document Type: Article

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