Game theory meets information security management

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

Volumn 428, Issue , 2014, Pages 15-29

  Fielder, Andrew ^a   Panaousis, Emmanouil ^b   Malacaria, Pasquale ^b   Hankin, Chris ^a   Smeraldi, Fabrizio ^b  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cyber security; Game theory; Information security management

Indexed keywords

CYBERSECURITY; DECISION MAKING; NETWORK SECURITY; OPTIMIZATION; SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION;

CYBER SECURITY; DECISION ALGORITHMS; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; GENERAL SUM GAMES; HUMAN DECISION-MAKING; INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENTS; MINIMAX; NASH EQUILIBRIA; SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS; SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84926463330     PISSN: 18684238     EISSN: 1868422X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-55415-5_2     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

1. 2013 data breach investigations report by verizon, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/
2. Hackmageddon.com, http://hackmageddon.com/ (accessed october 2013)
3. Acquisti, A., Grossklags, J.: Losses, gains, and hyperbolic discounting: An experimental approach to information security attitudes and behavior. In: Proc. of the 2nd AnnualWorkshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS 2003), vol. 3 (2003)
4. Alpcan, T., Bąsar, T.: Network security: A decision and game-theoretic approach. Cambridge University Press (2010)
5. Grossklags, J., Christin, N., Chuang, J.: Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games. In: Proc. of the 17th International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW 2008), pp. 209–218. ACM (2008)
6. Hankin, C., Malacaria, P.: Payoffs, intensionality and abstraction in games. In: Coecke, B., Ong, L., Panangaden, P. (eds.) Abramsky Festschrift. LNCS, vol. 7860, pp. 69–82. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)
7. Johnson, B., Grossklags, J., Christin, N., Chuang, J.: Nash equilibria for weakest target security games with heterogeneous agents. In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds.) Gamenets 2011. LNICST, vol. 75, pp. 444–458. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
8. Kannan, R., Theobald, T.: Games of fixed rank: A hierarchy of bimatrix games. Economic Theory 42(1), 157–173 (2005)
9. Kiekintveld, C., Islam, T., Kreinovich, V.: Security games with interval uncertainty. In: Proc. of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), pp. 231–238. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland (2013)
10. Kiekintveld, C., Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Ordóñez, F., Tambe, M.: Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games. In: Proc. of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), pp. 689–696 (2009)
11. Korzhyk, D., Yin, Z., Kiekintveld, C., Conitzer, V., Tambe, M.: Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 41(2), 297–327 (2011)
12. Ponemon Institute LLC. State of web application security, http://www.ponemon.org/library/2011-cost-of-data-breach-united-states
13. Lye, K.W., Wing, J.M.: Game strategies in network security. International Journal of Information Security 4(1-2), 71–86 (2005)
14. Manshaei, M., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Basar, T., Hubaux, J.: Game theory meets network security and privacy. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 251-253 (2011)