Nash equilibria for weakest target security games with heterogeneous agents

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

Volumn 75 LNICST, Issue , 2012, Pages 444-458

  Johnson, Benjamin ^a,d   Grossklags, Jens ^b   Christin, Nicolas ^a,c   Chuang, John ^d  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Economics; Game Theory; Heterogeneity; Security

Indexed keywords

CONFLICTING INCENTIVES; ECONOMIC INTERESTS; END USERS; HETEROGENEITY; HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS; INFORMATION ECONOMY; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PROTECTION LEVEL; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SECURITY; SECURITY CONTEXT; SECURITY INVESTMENTS; SOCIAL NORM; SOCIAL OPTIMUMS; SOCIAL PLANNERS; SUICIDE BOMBER;

ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 84869594963     PISSN: 18678211     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_31     Document Type: Conference Paper

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