Kant’s transcendental proof of realism

Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-299

  Westphal, Kenneth R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84926159528     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511584497     Document Type: Book

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