Transnational veto players and the practice of financial reform

British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 318-334

  Tsingou, Eleni ^a  

^a Copenhagen Business School ^*  (Denmark)

Author keywords

Financial reform; Global banking; Too big to fail; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926144009     PISSN: 13691481     EISSN: 1467856X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-856X.12031     Document Type: Article

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