Consumption smoothing and extended families

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume III

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 209-242

  Attanasio, Orazio P ^a,c   Ríos Rull, José Victor ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926102184     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610264.009     Document Type: Chapter

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