Incentives in peer-to-peer systems

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 593-612

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Chuang, John ^a   Feldman, Michal ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COPYRIGHTS; PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIORS; COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATIONS; DIVERSE APPLICATIONS; LARGE-SCALE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM; MULTIMEDIA STREAMING; PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKING; PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEM;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 84926094916     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.025     Document Type: Chapter

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