The evolution of cooperation under cheap pseudonyms

Proceedings - Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, CEC 2005

Volumn 2005, Issue , 2005, Pages 284-292

  Feldman, Michal ^a   Chuang, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY; INCENTIVE SCHEMES; SOCIAL WELFARE; WHITEWASHING ATTACKS;

COMPUTER CRIME; INTERNET; PROBABILITY; SYSTEM STABILITY; USER INTERFACES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33749055553     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ICECT.2005.91     Document Type: Conference Paper

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