A behavioral model of “muddling through” in the Chinese bureaucracy: The case of environmental protection

European Physical Journal C

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 120-147

  Zhou, Xueguang ^a   Lian, Hong ^a   Ortolano, Leonard ^a   Ye, Yinyu ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925863504     PISSN: 14346044     EISSN: 14346052     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/671335     Document Type: Article

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43. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this source of bureaucratic autonomy. To protect the anonymity of the research site, we have made technical changes in the presentation of the descriptive information, such as the number of MEPBs and CEPBs, as well as the designated reduction goals in COD and SO2 for the MEPB
44. Note that three CEPBs were given no task quota in the reduction of SO2, due to the targets of economic growth set for these jurisdictions. Hence, they are not represented in Figure 3
45. LH, “Notes on WNJH 5”, p. 1. (The empirical evidence is drawn from our fieldnote sources, as indicated here. The same applies to our references to other fieldnote sources below.)
46. LH, “Notes on WNJH 5”, p. 7.
47. LH, “Notes on WNJH 7”, p. 4.
48. LH, “Notes on WNJH 6”, p. 7.
49. LH, “Notes on WNJH 6”, p. 7.
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57. LH, “Notes on WNJH 36”, p. 2.
58. Andrew Kipnis, “Audit Cultures”.