County and township cadres as a strategic group: "building a new socialist countryside" in three provinces

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 67, 2012, Pages 67-86

  Schubert, Gunter ^a   Ahlers, Anna L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RURAL AREA; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 84857702618     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/665740     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Jae Ho Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China: Leadership and Implementation During Post-Mao Decollectivization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
2. Fan Jie, Thomas Heberer and Wolfgang Taubmann, Rural China: Economic and Social Change in the Late Twentieth Century (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2006);
3. Guo Gang, "China's Local Political Budget Cycles", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 621-32
4. Pierre Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008);
5. Hiroshi Sato, "Public Goods Provision and Rural Governance in China", China: An International Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 2008), pp. 281-98;
6. Lily L. Tsai, Accountability Without Democracy: Solidarity Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
7. Wu Yi, Xiaozhen xuanxiao: yige xiangzhen zhengzhi yunzuo de yanyi yu chanshi (Noisy Town: Interpretation and Explanation of a Township's Policies) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2007);
8. Zhao Shukai, "Obligatory Interactions in the Affairs of Township Governments", Chinese Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter 2006-07), pp. 17-25.
9. Cai Yongshun, "Irresponsible State: Local Cadres and Image-Building in China", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Policies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2004), p. 22.
10. Graeme Smith, "Political Machinations in a Rural County", The China Journal, No. 62 (July 2009), pp. 29-59; Smith reports on findings in one rural county in Anhui Province.
11. Ben Hillman, "Factions and Spoils: Examining Political Behavior within the Local State in China", The China Journal, No. 64 (July 2010), pp. 1-18.
12. Zhou Xueguang, "The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governance in China", Modern China, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 47-78.
13. In using the term "effective" rather than "efficient", we avoid making a statement on the quality of local policy implementation as measured against "objective" benchmarks.
14. The case studies are part of a broader research project led by Gunter Schubert and Thomas Heberer (University of Duisburg-Essen) which analyzes the role of county and township cadres in local policy implementation. The project is funded by the German Research Association (DFG) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Science. For details on the research methodology and selection criteria of our sites, see Appendix.
15. For a typology of local state formation in post-Mao China, defining the entrepreneurial and the developmental state,
16. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The State of the State", in Merle Goldman and Roderick McFarquhar (eds), The Paradox of China's Post- Mao Reforms (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 330-60.
17. Earlier studies that have conceptualized the local state as developmental include
18. Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue, Tethered Deer: Government and Economy in a Chinese County (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996)
19. Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
20. Tan Kong Yam, "China's 11th Five-year Plan: A Critical Perspective", in John Wong and Wei Liu (eds), China's Surging Economy: Adjusting for a More Balanced Development (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), pp. 55-132.
21. State Council, Quanmian zhengque lijie shehui zhuyi xinnongcun jianshe (Fully and Correctly Understand the Building of a New Socialist Countryside) (15 March 2006), at http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227640.htm,accessed 23 July 2010.
22. All policies aimed at rural development now appear under the heading of XNCJS. Major initiatives, such as the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) (nongcun xinxing hezuo yiliao zhidu), the enactment of the Law on Farmers' Professional Cooperatives (nongmin zhuanye hezuoshefa) in October 2006 and the adoption of a Comprehensive Rural Minimum Living Allowance System (zuidi shenghuo baoxian zhidu, abbreviated to dibao) in2007, have been brought together under this umbrella. See, for example, Beijing Review (Xinhua), "CPC Solicits Rural Reform Options" (14 October 2008), accessed 1 November 2008, at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-10/14/content_156719.htm. For more details on XNCJS,
23. Anna L. Ahlers and Gunter Schubert, "'Building a New Socialist Countryside'-Only a Political Slogan?", Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2009), pp. 35-62;
24. Minzi Su, China's Rural Development Policy: Exploring the "New Socialist Countryside" (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2009).
25. Peitao refers to the obligation of county, township and village governments to complement upper-level funding allocated for particular projects with funds of their own. The percentage of these complementary funds varies with local economic conditions. Peitao regulations are meant to make sure that projects are implemented properly and efficiently by a substantial financial engagement of the receiving side; it is also a necessity, as fiscal conditions are tight in rural China, and upper-level project funds need to be spread as widely as possible within a jurisdiction.
26. In Mizhi and Dingnan, as is apparently the case in most other counties in China, the older designation nonggongbu is used. In Zhejiang Province, however, this unit is called nongcun gongzuo bangongshi, or nonggongban. That XNCJS coordination is managed by a Party unit indicates the importance attached to it.
27. For more details
28. Anna L. Ahlers and Gunter Schubert, "'Building a New Socialist Countryside'".
29. The whole procedure sounds very time-consuming. However, formal bottom-up decision making is an important aspect of legitimizing a project with villagers, even if county and township leaders have pre-selected a number of villages. Our respondents at county and township level also emphasized that they attempt to even out development across the whole locality so that the same villages are not always selected for XNCJS projects. Therefore, village development blueprints and bottom-up initiatives are still necessary 16 Transfer payments can be used by county governments at their own discretion, whereas earmarked funds must be allocated according to pre-determined purposes. Tax rebates are also re-channeled to the counties by higher levels, but these account for only a tiny percentage of the total annual income in Mizhi, Qingyuan and Dingnan.
30. However, our respondents at city/provincial and county level strongly denied that any such negotiations take place. Funds would be assigned according to the development plans of the upper-level and "objective" (kexue) indicators, such as a county's population or economic structure, and also according to previous experience with the county governments.
31. According to this rationale, the peitao constrains the embezzlement and illegal diversion of public funds, for example, for the hiring of extra staff.
32. Liu Mingxing, Juan Wang, Tao Ran and Rachel Murphy, "The Political Economy of Earmarked Transfers in a State- Designated Poor County in Western China: Central Policies and Local Responses", The China Quarterly, No. 200 (2009), pp. 973-94.
33. The townships that we visited did not have to comply with the peitao themselves, as they did not control any meaningful funds. Township budgets, at least on our field sites, seemed to be strictly controlled by the county governments, and were very tight. In some cases, the accounts of township offices were screened online by the superior county bureau. Needless to say, the villages administered by these townships were fully dependent on county money allocated through the townships, so the peitao has to be provided by the village households.
34. Such limited township agency disappears in Graeme Smith's recent verdict that township governments have been "hollowed out" ("The Hollow State: Rural Governance in Chian", The China Quarterly, No. 203 (September 2010), pp. 601-18. 21 Usually, the Party secretary shares his work with his vice Party secretaries, who are assigned special areas of policy supervision. In Qingyuan County, we were able to observe closely the work of one vice Party secretary responsible for the construction of new houses in the villages.
35. This term was coined to encompass the breadth of issues connected with underdevelopment, social grievances and administrative shortcomings in the Chinese countryside. It defines three main aspects of rural life that must be targeted by government action: agriculture (nongye), villages (nongcun) and farmers (nongmin). The popular formulation of the sannong wenti can be traced back to Li Changping, a former rural Party cadre in Hubei, who wrote a letter to then Premier Zhu Rongji detailing the devastating conditions in rural areas, summarized in his statement, "peasants' life is really bitter, villages are absolutely poor and agriculture is truly endangered" (Li Changping, "Yige xiangdangwei shuji de xinlihua: gei Zhu zongli de xin" [A Township Secretary's Concerns: A Letter to Premier Zhu"], Shizhi Zhongguo, No. 25 [February 2001], at http://news.sohu.com/45/42/news204704245.shtml, accessed 10 November 2008).
36. Ganzhou City XNCJS Small Leading Group, "Ganzhou shi shehui zhuyi xinnongcunjianshe fazhan gangyao 2005-2010" (Ganzhou City Development Program for the Building of a New Socialist Countryside 2005-2010), July 2005. The "Ganzhou model" of implementing XNCJS is described in detail in Ganzhou City Bureau of the XNCJS Small Leading Group, "Ganzhou shi shehui zhuyi xinnongcun jianshe gongzuo ziliao huibian" (Collection of Materials Concerning the Building of a New Socialist Countryside in Ganzhou City), October 2007; and "Ganzhou shi xinnongcun jianshe caozuo zhinan" (Operation Guidelines for Building the New Countryside in Ganzhou City), January 2007.
37. For instance, he emphasized how he made the "Ganzhou spirit" concrete by a specific urbanization strategy applied in Dingnan (Interview, 10 September 2010).
38. A collective identity may also grow out of regular participation in ideological training courses organized by local Party schools or by informal networking between government bureaus and leading cadres from different townships or counties. A recent study on the institution of Party schools.
39. Frank N. Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today's China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
40. On the significance of ideology for policy implementation, although from a central government perspective,
41. Elizabeth Perry, "From Mass-Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: 'Constructing a New Socialist Countryside'", in Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (eds), Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 30-61;
42. Nicholas Dynon, "'Four Civilizations' and the Evolution of Chinese Post-Mao Socialist Ideology", The China Journal, No. 60 (July 2008), pp. 83-109.
43. Sebastian Heilmann, "From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process", The China Journal, No. 59 (January 2008), pp. 1-30;
44. Sebastian Heilmann, "Maximum Tinkering Under Uncertainty: Unorthodox Lessons From China", Modern China, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 2009), pp. 450-462;
45. Wang Shaoguang, "Changing Models of China's Policy Agenda Setting", Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 56-87.
46. These terms are basically interchangeable, but may bear different meanings when used in different localities.
47. A leading cadre of the county's Department of Rural Works described the establishment of model villages as "the essence of XNCJS"
48. This name is a pseudonym.
49. The county Party secretary later summoned us to tell us to leave the poor townships and villages in the county aside and focus our research on Huihuang Village, because that was the way that Mizhi was going to go. However, he did not prevent us going to those other places, which were, indeed, far from anything that Huihuang Village had achieved.
50. However, investment in those villages varied, and in no case reached what Huihuang received. In general, a model village (shidiancun) receives about 50,000 yuan a year, and about 500,000 yuan if it is a city-level model (shiji shifancun), of which there were 16 in Mizhi by the time of our last visit. Among the "ordinary" villages, 106 out of a total of 396 had been selected as shidiancun (or shifancun), in order to emulate Huihuang.
51. In Dingnan, a dian usually comprises a natural village (ziran cun) or one or more village small groups (cunmin xiaozu), that is, at least 30 households. Thus, one village can sometimes host up to 20 dian. Each dian receives a fixed amount of 160,000 yuan. By 2010, Dingnan County had 481 dian. In Qingyuan, XNCJS funds are not accounted for separately, asvillages receive financial support from different government departments at county level. We were thus not able to establish the exact sum of total project funding for each village.
52. John A. Donaldson, "Why Do Similar Areas Adopt Different Developmental Strategies? A Study of Two Puzzling Chinese Provinces", Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 18, No. 60 (June 2009), pp. 421-44, regarding strategic agency at provincial level.
53. During our fieldwork in Dingnan County, three villagers in another county in Jiangxi set themselves alight after a long quarrel with local authorities who had wanted them to leave their house.
54. For a description of this in Ganzhou Ganzhou City Bureau of the XNCJS Small Leading Group, "Ganzhou shi xinnongcun jianshe caozuo zhinan".
55. VAC leaders of the villages in Dingnan County reported unanimously that this pressure is built up by approaching friends (la pengyou) and relatives (la qinqi) of a household, who would tryto talk these villagers into compliance. This strategy of la guanxi or la qinqi, it was claimed, was efficient enough in most cases. Besides, "recalcitrants" could be forced into line by reminding them that almost the whole village had consented to a specific measure by democratic acclamation, and that by refusing they would be irresponsibly endangering the peace and order of the village.
56. Maria Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective", The China Quarterly, No. 173 (March 2003), pp. 35-52
57. Susan H. Whiting, "The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grassroots: The Paradox of Party Rule", in Barry Naughton and Dali L. Yang (eds), Holding China Together (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 101-19;
58. Zhao Shukai, "The Accountability System of Township Governments"; for recent Chinese publications,
59. Liu Xutao, Zhengzhi jixiao guanli: zhidu, zhanlüe yu fangfa (Government Performance Management: Institution, Strategy and Methods) (Beijing: Jixie Gongye, 2003);
60. He Fengqiu, Zhengfu jixiao pinggu xinlun (New Perspectives on Government Performance Assessment) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui, 2008);
61. Cui Shuqiang, Zhongguo difang zhengfu: jixiao pinggu fangfa yu yingyong yanjiu (Researching Assessment Methodology and its Application to Local Government Performance in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji, 2009).
62. In this paper, we focus on XNCJS-related performance or target evaluation and do not look specifically at the Party's cadre assessment system. For the latter,
63. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, "Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China", The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), p. 364;
64. Idem Hainan: State, Society and Business in a Chinese Province (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 79-82;
65. John P. Burns, "'Downsizing the Chinese State': Government Retrenchment in the 1990s", The China Quarterly, No. 175 (October 2003), pp. 361-86;
66. Kim Jaekwan, "An Inquiry of the Bianzhi Reform in Chinese Politics", Review of International and Area Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2005), pp. 1-37.
67. In Mizhi and Qingyuan, XNCJS evaluation was part of the regular bureau/office and cadre assessment procedures, thus overlapping with those procedures to a considerable extent. In Dingnan, the evaluation was conducted separately. No matter how the county and township governments administer the system, however, it imposes a heavy workload on all cadres because of the extensive preparatory work necessary, mainly computing data and statistics, writing long and detailed reports, answering inquiries from above and, finally, accompanying higher-level inspection teams who may stay for a couple of days.
68. Mizhi County Party Committee, "Mizhi xian niandu mubiao zeren kaohe ji lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu kaohe pingjia banfa (shixing)" (Guideline for the Annual Target Evaluation and the Evaluation of Leading Cadres and the Leading Cadre Group of Mizhi County [Trial Version]), 17 April 2009. In Qingyuan and Dingnan, "democratic evaluation" (minzhu kaoping or minzhu ceping) referred to assessments by leading representatives of the local People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference.