Self-Agency

The Oxford Handbook of the Self

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Pacherie, Elisabeth ^a  

^a INSTITUT JEAN NICOD   (France)

Author keywords

Actual end states; Cognitive architecture; Intended goal; Predicted action; Self agency

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925860072     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0020     Document Type: Chapter

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